The Extraordinary Ordinary Powers of Abductive Reasoning

Abstract

The psychology of cognition has been influenced by semiotic models of representation, but little work has been done relating semiotics and the process of cognition proper. In this paper, I argue that the semiotically relevant concept of abduction is crucial for this effort. Abduction is identified as the ground-state, or default, mode of cognition. As such, it deals with the issue of reasoning toward meaning and away from what Peirce called `genuine doubt'. In this fashion, abduction is shifted from being solely a logical and semiotic concept to a psychological concept. Abduction is first examined historically, and then further compared to the more traditional reasoning modes of deduction and induction to show how all three are necessary for any complete model of cognition and research into cognition. Different modes of abduction, including detection, diagnosis and divination, and different directions of abductive research in psychology are detailed.