GAME THEORETIC BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR EVACUEES' EXIT SELECTION
- 1 February 2010
- journal article
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Advances in Complex Systems
- Vol. 13 (1), 113-134
- https://doi.org/10.1142/s021952591000244x
Abstract
We present a model for evacuees' exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best-response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically by reacting optimally to other players' strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players' best-response functions defines a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game. In the model, the players are the evacuees and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and show that the game has a NE with pure strategies. We also analyze different iterative methods for finding the NE and derive an upper bound for the number of iterations needed to find the equilibrium. Numerical simulations are used to analyze the properties of the model.Keywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- A game theory based exit selection model for evacuationFire Safety Journal, 2006
- Competitive routing in networks with polynomial costsIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2002
- Modelling occupant interaction with fire conditions using the buildingEXODUS evacuation modelFire Safety Journal, 2001
- Simulating dynamical features of escape panicNature, 2000
- Multiuser rate-based flow controlIEEE Transactions on Communications, 1998
- Random Relaxation of Fixed-Point IterationSIAM Journal on Scientific Computing, 1996
- Social force model for pedestrian dynamicsPhysical Review E, 1995
- On the existence of equilibria in noncooperative optimal flow controlJournal of the ACM, 1995
- A stress model for people facing a fireJournal of Environmental Psychology, 1993
- Equilibrium points in n -person gamesProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 1950