Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg
- 14 May 2011
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 71 (3), 443-448
- https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr036
Abstract
I described an incoherence in one form of the higher order thought (HOT) theory that derives from its holding both that an appropriate higher order thought is sufficient for a conscious state and that being the object of an appropriate higher order thought is necessary for a conscious state. A (1) lone and (2) unconscious (i.e. not the object of another HOT) and (3) “empty” (i.e. reference-failing) higher order thought at t determines a conscious state at t, but – contrary to the necessary condition – there is no thought at t about that conscious state – unless the lone thought is about itself. But such self-reference would collapse the HOT theory into the rival same-order theory. As I noted in the article, this incoherence...This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 2007
- A higher order Bayesian decision theory of consciousnessProgress in Brain Research, 2007
- Two neural correlates of consciousnessTrends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005
- Perception of forbidden colors in retinally stabilized equiluminant images: an indication of softwired cortical color opponency?Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 2001