Agency Problems and Residual Claims
- 1 January 1998
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier BV in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Social and economic activities, like religion, entertainment, education, research, and the production of other goods and services, are carried on by different types of organizations, for example, corporations, proprietorships, partnerships, mutuals and nonprofits. There is competition among organizational forms for survival. The form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs. The characteristics of residual claims are important both in distinguishing organizations from one another and in explaining the survival of organizational forms in specific activities. This paper develops a set of propositions that explain the special features of the residual claims of different organizational forms as efficient approaches to controlling agency problems.Keywords
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Organization Theory and MethodologySSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
- Organizational forms and investment decisionsJournal of Financial Economics, 1985
- Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- Auditor size and audit qualityJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1981
- The Role of Nonprofit EnterpriseThe Yale Law Journal, 1980
- Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and CodeterminationThe Journal of Business, 1979
- Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting ProcessThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1978
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureJournal of Financial Economics, 1976
- Property Rights, Economic Decentralization, and the Evolution of the Yugoslav Firm, 1965-1972The Journal of Law and Economics, 1973
- The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearingThe Review of Economic Studies, 1964