Pandemic Influenza: Risk of Multiple Introductions and the Need to Prepare for Them
Open Access
- 21 February 2006
- journal article
- review article
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLoS Medicine
- Vol. 3 (6), e135
- https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0030135
Abstract
Containing an emerging influenza H5N1 pandemic in its earliest stages may be feasible, but containing multiple introductions of a pandemic-capable strain would be more difficult. Mills and colleagues argue that multiple introductions are likely, especially if risk of a pandemic is high.Keywords
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