Oil abundance and violent political conflict: A critical assessment
Open Access
- 1 August 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis Ltd in The Journal of Development Studies
- Vol. 43 (6), 961-986
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380701466450
Abstract
This paper addresses one of the empirical claims of the ‘resource curse’ argument, namely that oil abundance raises the probability of political violence. I argue that the two main theoretical premises of the oil-civil-war link, rent-seeking and the rentier state model, fail to provide a convincing argument as to why oil economies are more vulnerable to the onset of civil war. I find that three often-mentioned mechanisms as to why oil economies succumb to political violence not convincing; that oil economies are poor economic performers; that oil economies generate high corruption; and that oil economies tend to produce authoritarian regimes. I also examine the empirical evidence on the oil-civil-war link and conclude that the results are not robust. I conclude with some policy implications.Keywords
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