On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions
- 30 September 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 44 (9-10), 1040-1048
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.12.001
Abstract
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