Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy
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Open Access
- 1 April 2015
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 105 (4), 1339-1370
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.15000001
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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