The President, Congress, and the Financial Crisis: Ideology and Moral Hazard in Economic Governance
- 23 February 2012
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Presidential Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 42 (1), 81-100
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2012.03942.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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