Electoral Incentives for Political Corruption under Open-List Proportional Representation
- 1 August 2005
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 67 (3), 716-730
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00336.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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