Distributive Justice: Typology and Propositions

Abstract

Previous formulations of injustice have left undiscovered the majority of the possible types of justice and injustice and have tended to conceal many of the structural features of the few types that have been recognized. It is here proposed that a specification of the structural properties of injustice types is crucial to making accurate predictions of people's reactions in such situations. By clearly specifying the various comparisons between two particular individuals, and between them and people associated with given reference positions, with respect to their inputs and outcomes, a typology of just and injust situations is constructed. A set of propositions is advanced with regard to the order of the various types of injustice in terms of the magnitudes ofjustice motivation that a person is likely to experience in such situations. These propositions prompt the questioning of two of J. S. Adams' conjectures with regard to magnitudes of injustice. They also lead to the conclusion that any "main type" or "subtype" of injustice may vary in its magnitude of injustice, as determined by the structure of the particular "minor types" involved. This may, in some instances necessitate modifications in the predicted order between the main types and subtypes of injustice. Some methodological refinements are finally proposed with respect to the design and interpretation of research on injustice.