Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies
- 1 October 2002
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 45 (2), 469-507
- https://doi.org/10.1086/340394
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
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