The Political Ecology of Fisheries Depletion in Amazonia

Abstract

Because fish populations are the classical examples of common-property resources, Garrett Hardin's ‘tragedy of the commons’ is frequently cited as the cause of their decline. However, it has now been shown that many small community fisheries, as well as a number of larger commercial fisheries, are not managed according to the ‘commons’ model but rather are subject to internal limitedentry restrictions which prevent resource overexploitation. Further, Hardin's model ignores critical relationships which exist between common-property and private resources in many Third World rural societies. Changes in these relationships have significant implications for sustained yield management of common-property resources, such as fisheries, in these societies.In Amazonia, the current changing relationship between common-property and private resources on theterra firmeuplands profoundly affects the degree of exploitation that is experienced by the region's fisheries. It also has important implications for the survival of Amazonia's flood-forests which play a critical role in the region's fisheries ecology.