Group rationale, collective sense: Beyond intergroup bias

Abstract

In this paper, I contest the view of the group as a source of bias and irrationality, especially prevalent within social psychology. I argue that this negative evaluation often arises by applying inappropriate standards, relating to the wrong level of analysis (often the individual level). Second, the image of the group as bad and biasing is often overstated. For example, the evidence suggests that intergroup discrimination, rather than being universal or generic, is often constrained, proportionate and reflects functional and rational strategies for managing threats and opportunities at the group level. Third, although the recent upsurge of interest in group emotions could be seen to reinforce the dualism between rationality and emotion, the contemporary functional approach argues for group emotions as augmenting rather than contradicting rationality. However, we should be wary (and weary) of narrow economic and individualist notions of rationality; group identity may offer the opportunity to redefine rationality in more collective and prosocial ways