MultiDefender security games on networks
- 17 April 2014
- journal article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 41 (4), 4-7
- https://doi.org/10.1145/2627534.2627536
Abstract
Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high- consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. This deployment across essentially independent agencies raises a natural question: what global impact does the resulting strategic interaction among the defenders, each using a similar model, have? We address this question in two ways. First, we demonstrate that the most common solution concept of Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) can result in significant under-investment in security entirely because SSE presupposes a single defender. Second, we propose a framework based on a different solution concept which incorporates a model of interdependencies among targets, and show that in this framework defenders tend to over-defend, even under significant positive externalities of increased defense.Keywords
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- Software Assistants for Randomized Patrol Planning for the LAX Airport Police and the Federal Air Marshal ServiceInforms Journal on Applied Analytics, 2010
- Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport SecurityAI Magazine, 2009
- Bayesian stackelberg games and their application for security at Los Angeles international airportACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2008
- Computing the optimal strategy to commit toPublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,2006
- Maximizing the spread of influence through a social networkPublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,2003
- Interdependent SecurityJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2003
- Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, 2nd EditionPublished by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM) ,1998