Peer choice in CEO compensation
Open Access
- 1 April 2013
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 108 (1), 160-181
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.10.002
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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