The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion: credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural evolution
Top Cited Papers
- 31 July 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Evolution and Human Behavior
- Vol. 30 (4), 244-260
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.03.005
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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