To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning
- 4 January 2008
- journal article
- Published by Springer Science and Business Media LLC in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 41 (2), 155-168
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-007-9185-5
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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