The Development of Intermediation in French Credit Markets: Evidence from the Estates of Burgundy
- 1 December 2002
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 62 (4), 1024-1049
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050702001638
Abstract
We document how intermediaries shaped markets or, conversely, how market institutions constrained intermediaries. In Dijon, where the Estates of Burgundy’s debt amounted to nearly half of all bonds in that small market, there was limited need for intermediaries. In the 1740s the borrowing needs of the province expanded, and the estates began to borrow in Paris, where their debt remained a small fraction of the market, and where they relied on notaries to place their bonds and to create a secondary market. These developments assured the estates’ capacity to borrow and thus Burgundian autonomy from the French Crown.This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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