THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES
- 1 September 2006
- journal article
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Game Theory Review
- Vol. 8 (3), 499-514
- https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001053
Abstract
When the strategy set of a game is a continuum, its discretization may not conserve local properties even for arbitrarily fine strategy grids. This paper provides two technical lemmata which are useful to deal with these problems in particular contexts. Four applications are presented, regarding the discretization of Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies, a consumer optimization problem, and an insurance market.Keywords
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