Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India
Open Access
- 1 August 2002
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 92 (4), 1029-1043
- https://doi.org/10.1257/00028280260344588
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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