Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking: Evidence from internal loan ratings
- 31 January 2010
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Vol. 19 (1), 95-115
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2009.01.002
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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