Looking Beyond the CEO: Executive Compensation at Banks
Preprint
- 1 January 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier BV in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The literature on executive compensation at banks has proceeded largely under the assumption that a single elasticity can adequately describe the sensitivity ofKeywords
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