Abstract
This article introduces the concept of “stimulus field” and describes the role it plays in understanding common thought and language. A stimulus field specifies the psychophysical reality of any particular domain of phenomena. Consistent with various writings in “ecological psychology,” this article proposes that cognition about interpersonal phenomena is adapted to the stimulus field of those phenomena and, therefore, that our understanding of the relevant thoughts and language should specify and take account of that reality. The central assumption of this article is that, in the absence of knowing the true stimulus field for interpersonal phenomena, interdependence theory can fruitfully serve as a provisional specification of that field. After an overview of interdependence theory, this article summarizes some of the implications of this strategy. It shows that the theory helps us understand some of the presently known facts about the cognition of interpersonal phenomena and suggests hypotheses about other features of such cognitions. It highlights the abstract level at which interpersonal events are often viewed and identifies advantages and disadvantages of such thought. It suggests the basic terms in which schematic representations of interpersonal relations are cast. It suggests the bases in the stimulus field for the distinctions that people make between “person,” “situation,” and “interaction“ and for the differentiations they make within each of those broad categories. At the same time, it shows why these distinctions are often blurred, identifies the connections in the stimulusfield that underlie the implicit meanings of words and the stories people construct, and illustrates how the various connections enter into common assumptions and attributions.

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