Abstract
In 1977, two jumbo jets collided on the runway at Tenerife, Canary Islands. A year later, there were two spectacular midair collisions, one at Memphis and, shortly after, one at San Diego. These accidents have called into question the adequacy of air traffic control systems and have revealed numerous design problems that can lead to human error. Following the San Diego collision in September, 1978, involving an air carrier Boeing 727 and a Cessna /72, there was a hue and cry to "do something." Among the many proposed solutions were tighter control on visual flight rules aircraft and expansion of the positive control airspace. This resulted in a political battle involving general aviation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Congress. This paper examines collisions from a human factors perspective, seeing them as system-induced errors, resulting from an air traffic control system that emphasizes airspace allocation and political compromise, rather than dealing directly with the various problems facing controllers and pilots operating within the National Airspace System.

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