The Terrorist Endgame: A Model with Moral Hazard and Learning
- 1 April 2005
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 49 (2), 237-258
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704272193
Abstract
The author models the relationship between a government and former terrorists as a game with both moral hazard and learning. The government is uncertain about both the former terrorists’ ability and skill at providing counterterrorism aid. The government has the option—after observing the success or failure of counterterrorism—of replacing the former terrorist leadership with a new negotiating partner. This study demonstrates that the threat of replacement, in addition to promised concessions, provides incentives for former terrorists to exert counterterrorism effort, particularly when the potential replacements are of moderate ability. Furthermore, the author identifies conditions under which governments are likely to replace the former-terrorist leadership with which it has been negotiating. The model also has implications for the effect of counterterrorism successes on future concessions and the impact of the government’s ability to consider replacing the former terrorists on concessions and counterterrorism.Keywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and OrganizationsJournal of Conflict Resolution, 2005
- Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and OutbiddingPolitical Science Quarterly, 2004
- Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist ViolenceInternational Organization, 2002
- Strict Monotonicity in Comparative StaticsJournal of Economic Theory, 1998
- Terrorism and signallingEuropean Journal of Political Economy, 1993