Voting power in the proxy process: The case of antitakeover charter amendments
- 30 November 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 30 (1), 193-225
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(91)90042-i
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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