Two interpretations of Piaget’s account of the infant’s Copernican revolution are reviewed. Under the Absence interpretation, which is shown to be implicated in the translation of the two studies of infancy as well as in psychological commentary, infant cognition is taken to be a progression from perceptual experience of images to that of objects in the world. It is argued that this interpretation is incoherent since the infant’s development would be made impossible because of the philosophical theories used in that interpretation. An alternative, Indifferentiation interpretation is outlined in which the infant’s development is construed as a progression from a perceptual experience of tableaux to that of objects which exist independently in a spatial, temporal, and causal world. This interpretation is supported in two ways, firstly, by exegesis of central principles in Piaget’s classic and recent accounts of infancy and, secondly, by attention to its psychological consequences. Four such consequences are discussed, including theory-description, perception, object-conservation, and infant activity. The Kantian basis of the Copernican revolution is discussed with reference to the normative principles which are submitted to empirical scrutiny in Piaget’s account. It is concluded that Piaget’s constructivist account continues to be of valid psychological interest.