Executive compensation, supervisory board, and China’s governance reform: a legal approach perspective
- 17 February 2010
- journal article
- Published by Springer Science and Business Media LLC in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 35 (4), 445-471
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-010-0168-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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