Opportunistic underinvestment in debt renegotiation and capital structure
- 12 March 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 29 (1), 137-171
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(91)90017-e
Abstract
This paper models debt renegotiation as a bargaining game between debtholders and shareholder-oriented management, in which management credibly threatens to run down firm assets to force concessions from the creditors. Creditors anticipate this opportunistic behavior by management, creating an upper bound on debt capacity that is less than the value of the firm. If an advantage to debt is introduced, such as favorable tax treatment, an interior optimal capital structure obtains even in the absence of realized bankruptcy costs. Our model also explains variations in debt-equity ratios and the use of certain puzzling debt covenants.Keywords
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