Interest-Group Litigation in Federal District Court: Beyond the Political Disadvantage Theory

Abstract

In contrast to earlier research emphasizing litigation as a strategy for groups unable to succeed in other political arenas, this article proposes that the use of litigation is more generally a function of a group's political and legal resources compared to those of its opponents. Thus, patterns of interest-group litigation might parallel patterns of group activity in other arenas. A survey of interest-group litigation in private civil cases in Minnesota federal district court finds that cases involving regulatory policy attract the highest frequency of group participation, but the greater number of cases involving redistributive policy attracts more group activity overall. District court litigation also includes more citizen groups relative to occupational groups than a survey of interest groups at the national level found. The article concludes that courts may indeed be more receptive to politically disadvantaged litigants than other political arenas are, but that they are also used by powerful groups to enforce gains won politically.