The Impact of Regulatory Governance and Privatization on Electricity Industry Generation Capacity in Developing Economies
- 1 January 2006
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The World Bank Economic Review
- Vol. 20 (1), 115-141
- https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhj004
Abstract
This article assesses whether a regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are associated with superior outcomes in the electricity industry. The analysis, for 28 developing economies over 1980–2001, draws on theoretical and empirical work on the impact of telecommunications regulators in developing economies. Controlling for privatization and competition and allowing for country-specific fixed effects, both regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are positively and significantly associated with higher per capita generation capacity. This positive impact increases for more than 10 years, as experience develops and regulatory reputation grows. The results are robust to estimating alternative dynamic specifications (including error correction models), to inclusion of economy governance political risk indicators, and to controlling for possible endogeneity biases. The article concludes with a short discussion of causality in panel data modeling of governance models and the policy implications for regulatory reform.Keywords
This publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
- Regulatory Effectiveness : The Impact of Regulation and Regulatory Governance Arrangements on Electricity Industry OutcomesPublished by World Bank ,2005
- INTERNATIONAL COERCION, EMULATION, AND POLICY DIFFUSION: MARKET-ORIENTED INFRASTRUCTURE REFORMS, 1977-1999.Academy of Management Proceedings, 2004
- The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes: A Study of Interconnect Rates in EU TelecommunicationsSSRN Electronic Journal, 2004
- Growth StrategiesPublished by National Bureau of Economic Research ,2003
- Telecommunications Policies: Determinants and ImpactSSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
- Central Bank TransparencyThe Economic Journal, 2002
- Why Kill the Golden Goose? A Political-Economy Model of Export TaxationThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 2001
- Regulatory governance: criteria for assessing the performance of regulatory systems: An application to infrastructure industries in the developing countries of AsiaUtilities Policy, 1999
- Localized Market Power in the U.S. Airline IndustryThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1993
- Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic PerformancePublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1990