Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
- 1 November 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 64 (2), 612-631
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.009
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
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