Evolutionary dynamics on graphs: Efficient method for weak selection
- 13 April 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 79 (4), 046707
- https://doi.org/10.1103/physreve.79.046707
Abstract
Investigating the evolutionary dynamics of game theoretical interactions in populations where individuals are arranged on a graph can be challenging in terms of computation time. Here, we propose an efficient method to study any type of game on arbitrary graph structures for weak selection. In this limit, evolutionary game dynamics represents a first-order correction to neutral evolution. Spatial correlations can be empirically determined under neutral evolution and provide the basis for formulating the game dynamics as a discrete Markov process by incorporating a detailed description of the microscopic dynamics based on the neutral correlations. This framework is then applied to one of the most intriguing questions in evolutionary biology: the evolution of cooperation. We demonstrate that the degree heterogeneity of a graph impedes cooperation and that the success of tit for tat depends not only on the number of rounds but also on the degree of the graph. Moreover, considering the mutation-selection equilibrium shows that the symmetry of the stationary distribution of states under weak selection is skewed in favor of defectors for larger selection strengths. In particular, degree heterogeneity—a prominent feature of scale-free networks—generally results in a more pronounced increase in the critical benefit-to-cost ratio required for evolution to favor cooperation as compared to regular graphs. This conclusion is corroborated by an analysis of the effects of population structures on the fixation probabilities of strategies in general games for different types of graphs. Computer simulations confirm the predictive power of our method and illustrate the improved accuracy as compared to previous studies.
Keywords
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