Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment
- 1 May 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in European Economic Review
- Vol. 42 (3-5), 499-511
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00015-4
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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