Designing institutions for monetary stability
- 31 December 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy
- Vol. 39, 53-84
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2231(93)90003-f
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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