Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83
- 1 April 1985
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 15 (2), 143-164
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400004130
Abstract
Coalition formation has been the subject of much theoretical and empirical work in the past decade or so. The theories that have been tested all rest, one way or another, upon assumptions about the ways in which the payoff accruing to a particular coalition is distributed among its members. Yet much less empirical work has been done on the process of payoff distribution. Thus some of the fundamental assumptions of coalition theories, at least in terms of their practical application to coalition governments, have been more scantily tested. Several theories of payoff distribution have been recently developed, however. It is the purpose of this article to test the application of these theories to the practice of coalition government in Europe.Keywords
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