The Regulation of Entry
Top Cited Papers
- 1 February 2002
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 117 (1), 1-37
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399436
Abstract
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.Keywords
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