What makes for a compelling narrative to generate support for an aggressive war? The Russian government’s use of propaganda in shoring up domestic support for its war offers an opportunity to test two hypotheses about disinformation and, in particular, Russian rhetoric on its foreign policy. First, does the frequency with which audiences consume propaganda increase its salience? In this case, this applies to a near-monopoly of Russian state-run media over other sources and the willingness to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. Second, can governments construct nationalist framings as conduits of support for international aggression? The Russian government often depicts domestic elites and foreign leaders it opposes as fascists while portraying ethnic Russians abroad as victims. Are those Russians who think it is their government’s role to protect ethnic Russians abroad and those who believe that the Russian military is currently rooting out fascists in Ukraine more likely to support this war than others? In this paper, I conduct a descriptive logit-regression analysis of Russian public opinion data to assess the salience of the Russian government’s narrative.