The impact of firm ownership, board monitoring on operating performance of Chinese mergers and acquisitions
- 8 November 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Science and Business Media LLC in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 49 (4), 925-948
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-016-0612-y
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation (Zhejiang) (project ID: LQ12G020025)
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