Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems
- 1 December 1993
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 87 (4), 856-869
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2938819
Abstract
Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems - Volume 87 Issue 4 - Roger B. MyersonKeywords
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