Does Corporate Governance Matter? Evidence from Related Party Transactions in Malaysia
- 1 January 2011
- book chapter
- Published by Emerald
Abstract
This chapter investigates the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs), corporate governance, and firm performance. Specifically, this chapters examines the moderating effect of corporate governance on the RPTs–performance relationship. On the basis of 448 firm-year sample for 2005–2007, we find evidence that related transactions are detrimental to shareholders and thus reducing firm performance. However, the negative effect is mitigated with the presence of good governance, namely level of board independence and executive remuneration. Furthermore, we find auditor size as an external governance mechanism could also reduce the negative impact of RPTs.This publication has 36 references indexed in Scilit:
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