On Ignorance and Contradiction Considered as Truth-Values
Open Access
- 25 September 2007
- journal article
- conference paper
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Logic Journal of the IGPL
- Vol. 16 (2), 195-216
- https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzn003
Abstract
A critical view of the alleged significance of Belnap four-valued logic for reasoning under inconsistent and incomplete information is provided. The difficulty lies in the confusion between truth-values and information states, when reasoning about Boolean propositions. So our critique is along the lines of previous debates on the relevance of many-valued logics and especially of the extension of the Boolean truth-tables to more than two values as a tool for reasoning about uncertainty. The critique also questions the significance of partial logic.This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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