Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments
- 29 November 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 25 (1), 123-139
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(89)90099-8
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
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