Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review
Top Cited Papers
Open Access
- 6 March 2013
- journal article
- review article
- Published by The Royal Society in Journal of The Royal Society Interface
- Vol. 10 (80), 20120997
- https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2012.0997
Abstract
Interactions among living organisms, from bacteria colonies to human societies, are inherently more complex than interactions among particles and non-living matter. Group interactions are a particularly important and widespread class, representative of which is the public goods game. In addition, methods of statistical physics have proved valuable for studying pattern formation, equilibrium selection and self-organization in evolutionary games. Here, we review recent advances in the study of evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on top of structured populations, including lattices, complex networks and coevolutionary models. We also compare these results with those obtained on well-mixed populations. The review particularly highlights that the study of the dynamics of group interactions, like several other important equilibrium and non-equilibrium dynamical processes in biological, economical and social sciences, benefits from the synergy between statistical physics, network science and evolutionary game theory.Keywords
This publication has 145 references indexed in Scilit:
- Evolution of Cooperation in Multiplex NetworksScientific Reports, 2012
- Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-ridersScientific Reports, 2012
- Growth dynamics and the evolution of cooperation in microbial populationsScientific Reports, 2012
- The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods gamesNature Communications, 2011
- Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperationJournal of Theoretical Biology, 2010
- Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networksNature, 2010
- Snowdrift game dynamics and facultative cheating in yeastNature, 2009
- Winners don’t punishNature, 2008
- A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networksNature, 2006
- Complex networks: Structure and dynamicsPhysics Reports, 2006