Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind
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Open Access
- 6 September 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Cognition
- Vol. 77 (1), B25-B31
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00096-2
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 36 references indexed in Scilit:
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