Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
- 1 June 1984
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 33 (1), 152-171
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90045-0
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
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