Do elections set the pace? A quantitative assessment of the timing of European legislation
- 13 February 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis Ltd in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 16 (2), 239-255
- https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760802589255
Abstract
Many parliamentary systems are marked by regular periods of higher and lower legislative activity. This legislation cycle is characterized by an increase in the legislative output shortly ahead of elections and a decrease in legislative initiatives in the second half of the legislative term. This article shows that legislative cycles at the European level are different. First, it shows that the initiation of legislation peaks at the end of parliamentary terms rather than at the beginning. Second, the article shows that the adoption of legislation is only partially connected to the electoral cycle. Instead, the reallocation of agenda powers within the European Parliament twice during a legislature better explains the timing of the adoption of bills than the end of Parliament's term. This finding is especially relevant for legislation adopted under the co-decision procedure. The ‘procedural cartel theory’ of Cox and McCubbins (2005) combined with the ‘economic theory of legislation’ provide the theoretical basis that may explain this finding.Keywords
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