Managerial Incentives: Implications for the Financial Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts
- 1 December 1985
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Real Estate Economics
- Vol. 13 (4), 404-423
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00362
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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