Remuneration of independent directors: Determinants and policy implications
Open Access
- 26 December 2019
- journal article
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 17 (1, special), 278-291
- https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i1siart10
Abstract
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Abstract Taking advantage of a unique database on ItalianKeywords
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